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The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals
L INTRODUCTION
In 1971, Congress created the Temporary Emergency Court
of Appeals (TECA)1 to hear appeals from federal district court
decisions arising under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970
(ESA).2 The ESA originally authorized the President to im-
pose emergency wage, price, and rent controls,3 and later ESA
amendments authorized the President to allocate petroleum
products in emergencies.4 Although the ESA expired on April
1. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210,
§ 211(b) (1)-(2), 85 Stat. 749 (expired 1974), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, at
586 (1976).
2. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (ex-
pired 1974), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, at 586 (1976). The precedents for
this Act were the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23, and
the Defense Production Act of 1950, ch. 932, 64 Stat. 798 (expired 1953). These
Acts had imposed wartime economic controls. For the history of events leading
to the passage of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and an analysis of its
provisions, see Ginsburg, The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942: Basic Au-
thority and Sanctions, 9 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 22 (1942).
3. The ESA authorized the President to stabilize wages, prices, and rents
at the levels of May 25, 1970. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
379, § 2002, 84 Stat. 799 (expired 1974), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, at 586
(1976). Former President Nixon delegated this authority to the Cost of Living
Council (COLC). Exec. Order No. 11,615, 3 C.F.R. 602 (1971), as amended by
Exec. Order No. 11,617, 3 C.F.R. 609 (1971), and superseded by Exec. Order No.
11,627, 3 C.F.R. 621 (1971). The COLC delegated its authority to the Office of
Emergency Preparedness. 36 Fed. Reg. 16,215 (1971).
The programs under the ESA went through four phases. Phase I carried
out the "90 day freeze" from August 15 to November 13, 1971. See S. REP. No.
63, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1973), reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1299-1300. Phase H adjusted the frozen wages and price restraints and
lasted from November 14, 1971, to January 10, 1973. Id. at 2, reprinted in [19731
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1300. Phase III involved self-imposed standards
(within fixed limits) that lasted from January 11 to June 12, 1973; a price freeze
from June 13 to August 11, 1973, followed these self-imposed standards. See
COST OF iVING COUNCIL, ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM QUARTERLY RE-
PORT (Apr. 1-June 30, 1973). Phase IV required that controls be lifted from all
industries during the August 12, 1973, to April 30, 1974, period. See Oversight on
Economic Stabilization; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Production and Sta-
bilization of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 455-56 (1974) (statement of John T. Dunlop).
4. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-28,
§ 203(a) (3), 87 Stat. 27 (expired 1974), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1976).
For the legislative history of these amendments, see S. REP. No. 63, supra note
3, at 2-3, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1300-01.
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30, 1974,5 Congress continued the effect of these ESA amend-
ments by enacting the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of" -.
1973 (EPAA).6 Because the EPAA incorporated the ESA.provi-
sions for judicial review,7 the TECA currently has appellate ju-
risdiction of all federal district court cases arising under the
5. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-28,
§ 218, 87 Stat. 29, reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1976). This expiration did
not affect any pending action or any subsequent action based on any act com-
mitted prior to May 1, 1974. Id.
President Nixon continued some of the COLC's operations until December
31, 1974. See Exec. Order No. 11,788, 3 C.F.R. 877 (1974) (providing for orderly
termination of the ESA program and various follow-up activities).
6. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat.
627 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 751 (1976)). The EPAA gave the President
temporary authority to "deal with shortages of crude oil, residual fuel oil, and
refined petroleum products [in order to minimize] the adverse impacts of such
shortages ... on the American people and the domestic economy." Emergency
Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, § 26, 87 Stat. 628 (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 751(b) (1976)). The President's regulatory authority
under the EPAA expires on September 30, 1981. See 15 U.S.C. § 751(b) (1976).
See Newell v. Federal Energy Administration, 591 F.2d 704, 711 n.19 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1979); 15 U.S.C. § 760g (1976).
President Nixon established the Federal Energy Office (FEO) to issue reg-
ulations governing crude oil allocation. Exec. Order No. 11,748, 3 C.F.R. 822
(1973). The FEO was replaced by the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) in
June 1974. Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 761-790h
(1976); Exec. Order No. 11,790, 3 C.F.R. 882 (1974), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 761
note, at 1251 (1976). The FEA was replaced by the Department of Energy
(DOE) in August 1977. Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7131, 7151(a) (Supp. U 1978).
7. See EPAA, 15 U.S.C. § 754(a) (1) (1976). The judicial review provisions
of the amended ESA, as incorporated in the EPAA, provide:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction of cases or controversies arising under this title, or
under regulations or orders issued thereunder, notwithstanding the
amount in controversy; except that nothing in this subsection ... af-
fects the power of any court of competent jurisdiction to consider, hear,
and determine any issue by way of defense ... raised in any proceed-
ing before such court....
(b) (1) There is hereby created a court of the United States to be
known as the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals ...
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all ap-
peals from the district courts of the United States in cases and contro-
versies arising under this title or under regulations or orders issued
thereunder. Such appeals shall be taken by the filing of a notice of ap-
peal with the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals within thirty
days of the entry of judgment by the district court.
(c) In any action commenced under this title in any district court
of the United States in which the court determines that a substantial
constitutional issue exists, the court shall certify such issue to the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals. Upon such certification, the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals shall determine the appropri-
ate manner of disposition which may include a determination that the
entire action be sent to it for consideration or it may, on the issue certi-
fied, give binding instructions and remand the action to the certifying
court for further disposition.
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ESA or the EPAA.8
In most cases appealed to the TECA, either the only issue
appealed is one clearly arising under the ESA or the EPAA,9 or
the resolution of an issue clearly arising under the ESA or the
EPAA determines the outcome of the litigation, even though
non-ESA or non-EPAA issues are also involved.'0 In these
Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L No. 92-210, § 211, 85
Stat. 748, reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, at 589-90 (1976).
The creation of the Department of Energy (DOE) and the transfer of Fed-
eral Energy Administration (FEA) functions to the DOE, see note 6 supra, did
not abolish TECA jurisdiction over FEA-type DOE actions. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7192(a) (Supp. II 1978). Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7192(b) (Supp. II 1978), however, provides the federal district courts with
original jurisdiction of matters arising exclusively under the Department of En-
ergy Organization Act, leaving appellate jurisdiction of these matters to the cir-
cuit courts of appeals. See generally Eldns, The Temporary Emergency Court
of Appeals: A Study in the Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 1978 DuKF
L.J. 113, 115 n.9.
8. See note 7 supra. The TECA has jurisdiction, via certification proce-
dures, of substantial constitutional issues raised in federal district court cases
arising under the ESA/EPAA. See Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 211(c), 85 Stat. 749 (expired 1974), reprinted in 12
U.S.C. § 1904 note, at 586 (1976); Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973,
§ 5(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 754(a) (1) (1976).
The TECA also has original jurisidiction of all civil cases arising under the
Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-2, § 10(b), 91 Stat. 4, re-
printed in 15 U.S.C. § 717 note, at 922 (Supp. II 1978).
9. See, e.g., Twin City Barge & Towing Corp. v. Schlesinger, 603 F.2d 197
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979) (only issue appealed involved validity of Federal
Energy Administration (PEA) orders both granting and denying exception re-
lief from EPAA pricing regulations pertaining to natural gas liquids); Grigsby
v. Department of Energy, 585 F.2d 1069 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978) (only issue
appealed involved FEA orders ruling that oil producer charged more for oil
than allowed by prices fixed pursuant to EPAA), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908
(1979); General Crude Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 585 F.2d 508 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1978) (only issue appealed involved FEA and district court in-
terpretations of "producer" and "refiner" as used in EPAA), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 912 (1979); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 503 F.2d
1060 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974) (only issue appealed involved timing of ap-
peals raising only ESA natural gas pricing increases issues); Meat Cutters &
Butcher Workmen v. Cost of Living Council, 497 F.2d 1360 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1974) (only issue appealed involved Cost of Living Council and district
court rulings that negotiated, deferred wage increases violated ESA national
wage standards); Plumbers Local 519 v. Construction Indus. Stabilization
Comm., 479 F.2d 1052 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973) (only issue appealed in-
volved Construction Industry Stabilization Committee's reduction of negotiated
wage increase because of violation of ESA standards).
10. See, e.g., Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 591 F.2d
711, 716 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.) (despite common law breach of contract
claims, TECA had exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the case because "the res-
olution of the litigation in its entirety requires application of the EPAA"), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 168 (1979); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Johnson, 586 F.2d
1375, 1384 (10th Cir. 1978) (all issues appealed, including breach of contract alle-
gations, were inseparable from issues concerning ESA/EPAA oil pricing regu-
lations), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979); M. Spiegel & Sons Oil Corp. v. B.P. Oil
1980] 1249
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cases, the TECA has decided the entire appeal by deciding the
ESA or EPAA issues. There is, however, a narrow category of
cases in which ESA or EPAA issues are joined on appeal with
non-ESA or non-EPAA issues, and the resolution of the ESA or
EPAA issues in the cases does not dispose of the entire ap-
peal."1 When deciding these cases, both the TECA and the cir-
cuit courts have had to determine what issues the TECA may
decide on appeal.
In this narrow category of cases, courts have consistently
limited the TECA's jurisdiction to consideration only of the
ESA or EPAA issues involved. For example, in United States v.
Cooper,12 the TECA refused to hear a criminal count of a mul-
ticount appeal. The court reasoned that only the circuit court
of appeals could rule on charges arising under a federal crimi-
Corp., 531 F.2d 669, 671 (2d Cir. 1976) ("construction of the EPAA. .. will con-
trol the litigation"). See also Municipal Elec. Util. Ass'n v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 485 F.2d 967, 971 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (court refused to decide where
appeals would be heard if Federal Power Act issue was inseparable from ESA
questions).
11. See, e.g., Newell v. Federal Energy Administration, 591 F.2d 704 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1979) (TECA ruled on issue regarding applicability of
ESA/EPAA but did not rule on issue of reemployment rights under Federal
Energy Administration Act); Longview Ref. Co. v. Shore, 554 F.2d 1006 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App.) (TECA held to have jurisdiction of whole case involving
ESA/EPAA issues only because district court had dismissed other antitrust
and contractual claims), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977); Spinetti v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 522 F.2d 1401 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975) (TECA had jurisdiction
only of ESA/EPAA claims and not antitrust, fair trade, and contractual claims
also raised on appeal); Connecticut Mun. Group v. Federal Power Comm'n, 498
F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (circuit court heard Federal Power Act issues that
TECA had refused to hear); City of Groton v. Federal Power Comm'n, 487 F.2d
927 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973) (TECA refused to hear Federal Power Act is-
sues but upheld district court ruling that Federal Power Commission order did
not violate ESA); Municipal Elec. Util. Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 485
F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (circuit court considered only contractual issues in-
volving Federal Power Act, leaving TECA to decide the validity of proposed
rate increases and whether Federal Power Commission's refusal to suspend
rate schedules violated ESA or regulations promulgated thereunder); United
States v. Cooper, 482 F.2d 1393 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973) (TECA disclaimed
jurisdiction of criminal false representation conviction but would have heard
timely appeals of ESA issues); Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Laborers
Local 612, 476 F.2d 1388 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973) (TECA refused to hear ap-
pealed collective bargaining issues but did hear appealed ESA issues).
12. 482 F.2d 1393 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973). United States v. Cooper was
cited with approval in Bray v. United States, 423 U.S. 73, 75 (1975) (per curiam).
The Supreme Court did not, however, explicitly approve issue jurisdiction for
the TECA. The court instead emphasized that the contempt charge involved in
the appeal was a "'separate and independent proceeding at law ... to vindi-
cate the authority of the court' and was 'not a part of the original cause."' 423
U.S. at 75, (quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 445, 451
(1911)). Thus, to date, the Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the
proper approach to the TECA's jurisdiction.
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nal statute even though those charges were based on violations
of the ESA and were joined, at trial and on appeal, with ESA
claims.13 Similarly, in Clark Oil & Refining Co. v. Department
of Energy,14 the TECA held that it lacked subject matter juris-
diction because the only issue actually adjudicated by the dis-
trict court arose solely under the Department of Energy Act
and not the EPAA even though the plaintiff's only claim for re-
lief arose under the EPAA.15 In other cases the TECA has re-
13. United States v. Cooper, 482 F.2d at 1397-99. Cooper, a landlord, was
charged with willfully and knowingly making false representations about mate-
rial facts within the jurisdictions of the Department of the Treasury, the IRS,
and the Price Commission. These charges stemmed from violations of rent
controls promulgated pursuant to the ESA. The district court found Cooper lia-
ble both civilly (for ESA violations) and criminally (for false representation
and ESA criminal violations), and entered separate civil and criminal judg-
ments against him on separate dates. Id. at 1395. Cooper appealed his criminal
conviction to the Ninth Circuit but did not appeal to the TECA. The Ninth Cir-
cuit transferred the entire appeal to the TECA for further proceedings, con-
cluding that sole jurisdiction to review the matter was vested by statute in the
TECA. Id. at 1396.
The TECA held that, even though the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction of the
appeal from the criminal conviction, the circuit court lacked authorization to
transfer all or part of the appeal to the TECA. Id. at 1398. Although the joinder
of the claims at trial was permissible, on appeal the issues should have been
severed. Because timely appeal of the ESA issues was not filed with the
TECA, the TECA lacked jurisdiction to hear even the ESA issues. Id. at 1400.
14. No. DC-53 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1979).
15. Clark Oil & Ref. Co. v. Department of Energy, No. DC-53, slip op. at 10
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1979). In Clark, Commonwealth Oil Refining Co.
(Corco) had applied for a grant of exception relief offered under the oil entitle-
ments program-a Department of Energy effort to provide incentives for trans-
porting California crude oil to out-of-state refineries. The Department of
Energy's Office of Hearing Appeals granted relief to Corco in a proposed order.
Id. at 3. Other refiners objected to this proposed order, triggering Department
of Energy proceedings to review the proposed relief. Corco received interim re-
lief so that it could ship oil to Puerto Rican refineries during the pending De-
partment of Energy proceedings. The other refiners appealed the order
granting Corco interim relief to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC). Based on regulations issued after these appeals were filed, the FERC
dismissed the appeals, holding that it lacked the statutory authority to review
grants of interim relief. Id. at 4. One refiner filed a complaint in federal district
court alleging that the FERC improperly refused to review the interim order.
The district court held that the FERC had improperly refused to review the or-
der and remanded the case to the FERC. Id. The Department of Energy and
Corco appealed this district court holding to the TECA.
The threshold question on appeal to the TECA was whether the TECA had
jurisdiction over the appeal. The plaintiffs/appellees argued that the adjudi-
cated issue arose solely out of the Department of Energy Act and was outside
the TECA's jurisdiction. Id. at 5. The defendants/appellants argued that, even
though the adjudicated issue arose solely from the Department of Energy Act,
it was part of a larger "case" arising under the EPAA and was therefore within
the TECA's jurisdiction. Id. at 7. The TECA majority accepted the plain-
tiffs'/appellees' argument and dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The majority rejected the defendants'/appellants' argument that
1980] 1251
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fused to hear antitrust, fair trade, and contract claims that were
joined with ESA or EPAA issues on appeal.16
Relying on the familiar tenet that grants of special jurisdic-
tion should be strictly construed,17 most courts have found that
limiting the TECA's jurisdiction to ESA and EPAA issues most
closely conforms with the congressional purpose for creating
the TECA. In Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. New England
Petroleum Corp.,'8 however, the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit moved beyond mere reliance on the tenet of strict
construction and provided the most comprehensive analysis to
date of the TECA's jurisdictional grant.19 The court considered
three approaches to allocate appellate jurisdiction between a
federal court of appeals and the TECA when several issues had
been adjudicated by a federal district court in a single case.
First, following the plain language of the TECA's jurisdictional
the TECA has broad jurisdiction based on the nature of the "case" appealed
and failed to accept the dissent's view that an adjudicated procedural issue
arising wholly within an EPAA claim should be heard by the TECA. Id. at 10.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, dismissed, for lack of juris-
diction, an appeal from a Florida federal district court that had dismissed an
EPAA claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The circuit court
concluded that the TECA had sole jurisdiction of the appeal. Ven-Fuel, Inc. v.
Department of Energy, (5th Cir. Nov. 26, 1979).
16. See Longview Ref. Co. v. Shore, 554 F.2d 1006 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977); Spinetti v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 522 F.2d 1401
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975).
17. See, e.g., Clark Oil & Ref. Co. v. Department of Energy, No. DC-53, slip
op. at 10 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1979) ("Jurisdiction is to be strictly
construed."); Spinetti v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 552 F.2d 927, 930 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1977) (Strict construction of statutory grants of jurisdiction is often al-
luded to in TECA decisions.); United States v. Cooper, 482 F.2d 1393, 1398
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973) ("[A] loose construction [of the TECA's jurisdic-
tional grant] is unacceptable in light of the traditional rule that courts of spe-
cial jurisdiction should strictly construe their statutory grants of jurisdiction.").
18. 604 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1979).
19. Coastal States Marketing, Inc. (Coastal States) sued New England Pe-
troleum Corporation (Nepco) for damages resulting from Nepco's alleged
breach of a contract to buy oil from Coastal States. Jurisdiction was based on
diversity of citizenship. Nepco moved to reopen discovery in order to prove
that Coastal States had overcharged Nepco in violation of ESA/EPAA price
controls, thus making the sales contract illegal. Nepco's motion was not
granted and Nepco was found liable for $192,936. Id. at 181.
The Second Circuit remanded the case, permitting Nepco to demonstrate
the illegality of the sales contract. Id. On remand, however, the district court
judge denied all relief requested by Nepco, concluding that the sales transac-
tions were exempt from mandatory price controls and were not illegal. Id.
Nepco appealed the denial of the motions for relief to both the Second Cir-
cuit and the TECA. Nepco then obtained a stay of proceedings in the TECA
and moved to have the appeal in the Second Circuit transferred to the TECA,
arguing that section 211(b) (2) of the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments
of 1971 granted exclusive jurisdiction of the matter to the TECA. Id.
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grant,20 the TECA could have jurisdiction only of those issues
or cases "arising under" the ESA or EPAA according to the
rules of traditional federal question "arising under" analysis
(arising under jurisdiction).21 Under this approach, the TECA
would have jurisdiction of ESA or EPAA issues raised in the
complaint but not those raised in the answer or counterclaim.22
Second, the TECA could have exclusive jurisdiction of all is-
sues appealed from district court cases that had involved any
ESA or EPAA issue, even though the issue was raised as a de-
fense or counterclaim (TECA case jurisdiction).23 Third, the
20. See note 7 supra.
21. The Constitution provides that federal courts may be given jurisdiction
over "Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Au-
thority." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. The problem in interpreting this clause
is defining "arising under." There is no consensus on the definition of this
phrase. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 17 (3d ed.
1976). Some scholars argue that original federal question jurisdiction exists
only when there is a substantial claim founded directly upon federal law.
Mishin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L, REV. 157,
165, 168 (1953). See generally Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement
that a Case Arise Directly Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L RE v. 890 (1967);
Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (Part 11), 36 U. CHL
L. REv. 268, 276-79 (1969).
22. Since 1877, the scope of federal question jurisdiction has been nar-
rowed by applying the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, which requires that the
federal question appear on the face of the complaint. See Gold-Washing &
Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 203 (1877). Thus, no federal question jurisdic-
tion exists if the only federal question raised is in the answer, defense, or coun-
terclaim. Id. Likewise, no federal question jurisdiction exists when a plaintiff
anticipates federal question defenses in his complaint. Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 129 (1974). See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 21,
§§ 17-22.
Only the Seventh Circuit has interpreted section 211(b)(2) of the Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971 as "consistent with interpreta-
tions of the same phrase, 'arising under,' in the context of federal question
jurisdiction in the federal courts." St Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Ogilvie, 496 F.2d 1324,
1326 (7th Cir. 1974) (defendant's counterclaim based on ESA grounds did not
make the case appealable to the TECA).
23. The TECA has heard ESA or EPAA issues when raised by counter-
claims or answers. See, e.g., Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Co.,
591 F.2d 711 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.) (issues raised by Gulfs counterclaim
clearly arose under EPAA, and TECA would have heard them if timely appeal
to TECA had not been withdrawn), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct 168 (1979); Mountain
Fuel Supply Co. v. Johnson, 586 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1978) (ESA/EPPA issues
raised in counterclaim were properly appealed to TECA), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
952 (1979); Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Caribou Four Corners, Inc., 573 F.2d 1259
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978) (defendant's answer raised issue of EPAA strip-
per well exemption and district court made findings of fact on that issue; there-
fore appeal to TECA was proper). The case approach is commonly argued
before the courts. See, e.g., Clark Oil & Ref. Co. v. Department of Energy, No.
DC-53 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1979); Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v.
New England Petroleum Corp., 604 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Cooper, 482 F.2d 1393 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973).
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TECA could have exclusive jurisdiction only of ESA or EPAA
issues raised on appeal, leaving the appropriate court of ap-
peals to decide any non-ESA or non-EPAA issues (TECA issue
jurisdiction). The Coastal States court then described the dis-
advantages and advantages of each approach:
Each of the three approaches implicates conflicting considerations.
Limiting the TECA to traditional "arising under" jurisdiction makes
applicable a well-developed body of jurisdictional law, yet scatters
among the courts of appeals some ESA issues, raised by way of answer
or otherwise, on which the expertise of the TECA would be helpful.
Giving the TECA "case" jurisdiction assures uniform decision-making
of all ESA issues, yet withdraws from the courts of appeals many non-
ESA issues, which may really be the dominant issues in the case and
which the TECA may have no interest and no special competence in
deciding. Splitting the cases and giving the TECA only TECA "issue"
jurisdiction assures uniformity of decision-making on all ESA issues
and avoids burdening the TECA with non-ESA issues, yet encounters
the risk of delay and confusion inevitably associated with a system of
bifurcated appeals.2 4
After determining that neither the language creating the TECA
nor its legislative history conclusively defined the TECA's juris-
diction,25 the court turned to existing precedent to resolve the
issue. It rejected "traditional arising under jurisdiction" be-
cause courts had not limited the TECA's jurisdiction to issues
raised in the complaint.26 Case jurisdiction was also ruled out
because the TECA traditionally disclaimed jurisdiction of all
non-ESA or non-EPAA issues.27 The court concluded that is-
24. Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp., 604
F.2d 179, 183 (2d Cir. 1979) (footnotes omitted).
25. Congress used the phrase "cases and controversies arising under" in
section 211(b) (2) of the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971. The
court considered this strong but not conclusive evidence that the traditional
federal question meaning should also be applied to the words used in the ESA.
Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp., 604 F.2d 179,
183 (2d Cir. 1979). The court also noted that Congress did not intend to have all
ESA issues reviewed by the TECA, because the lawmakers did not give federal
district courts original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear state cases raising
ESA issues in defenses. Id. The Second Circuit suggested, however, that fed-
eral district court cases in which such issues are raised in answers may be
within the TECA appellate jurisdiction because "important federalism con-
cerns weigh against expanding removal of state court cases, [but] are totally
absent when the only issue is which of two coordinate federal appellate courts
has jurisdiction." Id.
The court also concluded that the legislative history "provides no aid in
resolving the § 211(b) (2) [TECA jurisdiction] issue posed in this case." Id. at
184. The court then considered two legislative reasons for creating the TECA-
speed and consistency in decision making. The court determined that consis-
tency would best be obtained by using the issue approach to define the TECA's
jurisdiction, while speed would be better achieved by using either the tradi-
tional arising under approach or the case approach. Id.
26. 604 F.2d at 183.
27. See id. at 184-85.
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sue jurisdiction was proper because the existing bifurcated ap-
pellate system demonstrated acceptance of the issue
approach.2 8
This Note critically examines the analysis that courts have
used to confine the TECA's appellate jurisdiction solely to is-
sues concerning the ESA or EPAA and identifies problems in-
herent in the issue approach. An alternative analysis is then
suggested. The Note proposes that the TECA should be
granted "limited case jurisdiction" under which the TECA
would be required to decide all issues in a case when any ESA
or EPAA issues have been adjudicated by the district court.
Currently, there are proposals before Congress that would cre-
ate other specialized courts which structurally resemble the
TECA. This Note suggests that Congress carefully define the
jurisdictions of these proposed courts in order to avoid the
problems now facing the TECA.
II. PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE CURRENT
DEFINITION OF TECA JURISDICTION
Limiting the TECA's jurisdiction to consideration of only
ESA and EPAA issues requires courts to sever the issues in
some appeals so that the circuit court may take appellate juris-
diction of those issues not arising under either the ESA or
EPAA.29 This system of bifurcated appeals often creates
problems for litigants, causes forced decisions, and results in
inefficient judicial administration.
A system of bifurcated appeals can easily confuse litigants
concerning the proper forum for their appeal.3 0 Of course,
28. Id. at 184-87. The court further maintained that the congressional pur-
pose in creating the TECA would not be served if every ESA issue raised, even
if not adjudicated, could be the basis for appeal to the TECA. Thus, the court
ruled that ESA issues must be adjudicated by the district court in order to
form the basis for appeal to the TECA. Id. at 186-87.
The court again recognized that if the TECA's jurisdiction was confined to
ESA or EPAA issues, the phrase "cases and controversies arising under" would
assume a meaning different from that normally associated with those words.
The court, however, justified that difference in two ways. First, the court noted
that there were no comity considerations in this case. Second, the court stated:
Whatever the hazards might be in forecasting whether a federal ques-
tion will really be in controversy when pleaded in an answer, no simi-
lar risks are encountered in routing to a specialized federal appellate
court all issues within its special competence that have actually been
adjudicated in a district court.
Id. at 186.
29. See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
30. The best example of this confusion is found in Citronelle-Mobile Gath-
ering, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 591 F.2d 711 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
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some confusion is unavoidable whenever specialized subject
matter courts are involved since litigants must determine
whether the circuit court or the special court is the proper ap-
pellate forum.3 1 The existence of bifurcated appeals makes this
determination of the proper forum even more difficult; litigants
must decide the proper forum for each possible issue on appeal
rather than for the appeal as a whole. Litigants who make this
determination improperly may, in extreme cases, be deprived
of appellate review altogether.3 2 A system of bifurcated ap-
100 S. Ct. 168 (1979). Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. (Citmoco), sued Gulf Oil
(Gulf) for money damages arising from Gulf's alleged breach of a contract to
buy oil from Citmoco at prices above the maximum ceiling price allowed by the
EPAA. Gulf counterclaimed for the difference between the price charged and
the lawful maximum ceiling price. Citmoco raised a constitutional issue that
the district court refused to certify to the TECA. Citmoco appealed the district
court judgment to both the Fifth Circuit and the TECA. 591 F.2d at 713-14.
Later, Citmoco moved to dismiss its appeal to the TECA. Id. at 715. Although
that motion was granted, Citmoco had requested the dismissal only because
Citmoco was certain that the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction over the appeal. Id.
The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court with directions to
certify to the TECA the constitutional questions raised by Citmoco. The TECA
held that although the controversy could have been heard in the TECA if
timely notice of appeal had been filed there, the Fifth Circuit lacked jurisdic-
tion to order the district court to certify the constitutional question to the
TECA. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the TECA terminated when Citmoco vol-
untarily withdrew its appeal to the TECA. Id. at 716.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently recognized the problems
associated with bifurcated appeals. See Oklahoma Assoc. of Consumers & Pro-
ducers v. Fea, No. 79-1847, slip op. at 5 (10th Cir. Oct. 23, 1979) ("[Nothing] other
than mass confusion [will be gained] by the promoting of simultaneous circuit
court TECA appeals.").
31. Cases defining the subject matter jurisdiction of the Special Court cre-
ated by the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 701, 719 (1976), also
illustrate this point. See, e.g., In re Erie Lackawanna Ry., 563 F.2d 784 (6th Cir.
1977); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Blanchette, 551 F.2d 127 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 434 U.S. 856 (1977); Stratford Land & Improvement Co. v. Blanchette,
448 F. Supp. 279 (Spec. Ct. 1978); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Illinois, 423 F. Supp.
941 (Spec. Ct.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1095 (1976). See also Horton v. Humphrey,
146 F. Supp. 819, 820-21 (D.D.C. 1956) (U.S. district court disclaimed jurisdiction
of import duty question, holding that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
was proper appellate forum), affid, 352 U.S. 921 (1956).
The TECA, in Clark Oil & Ref. Co. v. Department of Energy, No. DC-53, slip
op. at 8-9 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1979), acknowledged the confusion
caused by the possibility of dual appellate review. See also Coastal States Mar-
keting, Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp., 604 F.2d 179, 186 n.9 (2d Cir. 1979).
32. In United States v. Cooper, 482 F.2d 1393 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973),
see note 13 supra, Cooper lost his appellate review of the ESA issues in the
case because his appeal to the TECA was untimely and because the TECA
held that the Ninth Circuit's transfer of jurisdiction to the TECA was improper.
482 F.2d at 1400. On these facts, even if Cooper had appealed to the TECA he
would have been forced to decide which court had jurisdiction of the false rep-
resentation charges that were part of the appeal. According to the TECA's de-
cision, even the Ninth Circuit was unable to properly make this determination.
Id.
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peals may also impose undue hardship on litigants. Undue
hardship may occur when arguments must be made before two
different courts which may be located in different cities. 33
Bifurcated appeals may also cause forced decision making
when the TECA and a circuit court must decide nearly identi-
cal but severed issues. For example, at least one circuit court
that was considering issues severed from ESA issues was left
no real choice in making its decision. The court stated:
Apparently, no one called the attention of TECA to the appeals with
which the Tenth Circuit is now concerned.
We find ourselves in an anomalous situation. Appeals have been
taken to both TECA and the Tenth Circuit from the same district court
judgment. Both appeals deal with the same subject, the validity of the
March 13 contract. In TECA the question was compliance with the Ec-
onomic Stabilization Act. In the Tenth Circuit the question is the au-
thority of Local 612 to make the contract in violation of the rules and
policies of the parent union.
A strange situation exists when two different appellate courts are
reviewing the same district court judgment .... An intolerable situa-
tion would result if we came out with a different disposition than did
TECA.34
Finally, bifurcated appeals may cause unnecessary and un-
desirable delay. Even advocates of the issue approach recog-
nize that the ultimate resolution of an appeal will be delayed
when an action in either the circuit court or the TECA must be
stayed pending the decision of related issues in the other
court.3 5 In cases in which the proceedings in the other court
need not be stayed, the parties must still wait until the busier
circuit court resolves its non-ESA or non-EPAA issues before
they can obtain the final disposition of the appeal. Moreover,
the process of allocating jurisdiction between the two courts
may cause delay and inefficient use of judicial resources.36
33. Although the TECA hears cases in the circuit in which the case arose,
the circuit court may hear the same case in a different city. For example,
Gordon v. Laborers' Int'l Union, 490 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 836 (1974), was heard in Denver, but its companion case, Associated Gen.
Contractors, Inc. v. Laborers' Local 612, 476 F.2d 1388 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1973), was heard in Oklahoma City.
34. Gordon v. Laborers' Int'l Union, 490 F.2d 133, 139 (10th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
35. The possibility of delay was acknowledged in Coastal States Marketing,
Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp., 604 F.2d 179, 186 & n.9, 187 n.10. See also
Newell v. Federal Energy Administration, 591 F.2d 704, 709 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1979) (TECA made no comment on Federal Energy Administration or De-
partment of Energy issues; the proceedings considering these issues had been
stayed by the District of Columbia Circuit Court pending TECA resolution of
ESA/EPAA issues).
36. In Connecticut Mun. Group v. Federal Power Comm'n, 498 F.2d 993
(D.C. Cir. 1974), the District of Columbia Circuit Court had refused to hear the
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I. THE ANALYSIS USED TO SUPPORT ISSUE
JURISDICTION
Both the Coastal States analysis and the more typical anal-
ysis that courts have used to support the issue approach are
flawed. The Coastal States analysis is faulty because the court
initially restricted its analysis to a choice among the three po-
tential approaches most frequently offered by courts when de-
fining the TECA's jurisdiction, without first carefully grounding
the analysis in the congressional purpose for creating the
TECA.37 As a result, this analysis fails to consider approaches
that may be more consistent with congressional intent.
The more traditional analysis used by other courts is
flawed by rigid adherence to the presumption that "courts of
special jurisdiction should strictly construe their statutory
grants of jurisdiction."38 Application of that presumption is un-
appealed issues on July 23, 1973, ruling that the TECA was the appropriate fo-
rum. Id. at 995. The TECA later refused to hear some of those issues in City of
Groton v. Federal Power Comm'n, 487 F.2d 927, 935 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1973), holding that the District of Columbia Circuit Court was the only proper
appellate forum. The circuit court was then forced to reconsider the issue in
Connecticut Mun. Group v. Federal Power Comm'n, 498 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.
1974). Acknowledging the delay and confusion suffered by the parties in this
case, the circuit court announced
the accommodation which will be made in future cases where this
Court is asked to review an order of the Federal Power Commission
raising Federal Power Act issues which appear inextricably interwoven
with [ESA] issues .... Our course... will be to hold our review in
abeyance until review by the District Court and TECA is completed.
This will permit TECA to dispose of questions uhder the [ESA].
TECA's disposition under Section 211(a) of that Act will clarify what
questions may remain for disposition by this Court under Section
313(b) of the Federal Power Act. This is a common sense accommoda-
tion of the two jurisdictional schemes.
Id. at 998.
The TECA disposes of nearly one-third of its cases on jurisdictional
grounds. Clark Oil & Ref. Co. v. Department of Energy, No. DC-53, slip op. at 2
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1979) (Hoffman, J., dissenting). Commentators
recognize that "it would be unjust to litigants to create [a court] in a form
which resulted in a large volume of disputes over its jurisdictional limits. Juris-
dictional bickering is the most wasteful kind of litigation, and any cause of
much of this activity is unacceptable." P. CARRiNGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSEN-
BERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 170 (1976).
37. See 604 F.2d at 182-83. That these are the most frequently urged ap-
proaches is evident from case law. See, e.g., Bray v. United States, 423 U.S. 73
(1975) (per curiam) (Supreme Court rejects unlimited case approach on facts
of case); Clark Oil & Ref. Co. v. Department of Energy, No. DC-53, slip op. at 9-
10 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1979) (case approach urged by counsel but
rejected by TECA); St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ogilvie, 496 F.2d 1324, 1326 (7th Cir.
1974) (court uses traditional arising under approach by applying well-pleaded
complaint rule).
38. United States v. Cooper, 482 F.2d 1393, 1398 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1973). This rule of statutory construction has been applied frequently by the
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warranted in the context of the TECA. Courts citing the rule of
strict construction emphasize the special expertise and compe-
tence of the TECA.39 This suggests that the court's narrow ap-
plication of the rule stems from a belief that "it is more
desirable to use judges who hear all types of cases than to cre-
ate a special tribunal with judges who hear only [one] kind of
case."4 TECA judges, however, are not appointed to serve ex-
clusively on the TECA, but are selected from the federal judici-
ary to serve on the TECA in a part-time capacity.41 Because
they serve part-time, they are not likely to develop the "tunnel
TECA. See Spinetti v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 552 F.2d 927, 930 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1977) (applying strict construction rule); Spinetti v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
522 F.2d 1401, 1403 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975) (citing strict construction lan-
guage of Cooper and reiterating rule.) Both Spinetti cases relied on United
States v. California, 504 F.2d 750 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1015 (1975), as precedent for applying the rule. Such reliance, however, is
misplaced. In United States v. California, the TECA strictly construed the
ESA savings clause provisions in order to determine whether the case ap-
pealed was within the exceptions of the clause. The TECA stated that "this
contention must be considered in light of [the rule] of statutory construction
[that] jurisdictional statutes are to be strictly construed," id. at 754, and cited
Utah Junk Co. v. Porter, 328 U.S. 39, 44 (1946), as authority for that proposition.
In Utah Junk, however, the Supreme Court construed a procedural provision of
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (expired 1947), that
allowed aggrieved parties to protest governmental price schedules promulgated
under that act "at any time" after the price schedules' effective date. The
Supreme Court determined that a close reading of the statute supported the
conclusion that Congress intended to liberalize the right to challenge the valid-
ity of price regulations. The effect of reading the statute strictly was to give the
Emergency Court of Appeals broader jurisdiction; the strict construction rule
did not require a narrow reading of the statute but merely a "close" reading.
Thus, the TECA's conclusion that the strict construction rule requires a narrow
construction of jurisdictional grants is not supported by the Supreme Court's
opinion in Utah Junk.
39. See, e.g., Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. New England Petroleum
Corp., 604 F.2d at 183, 186. See also Clark Oil & Ref. Co. v. Department of En-
ergy, No. DC-53, slip op. at 10 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1979).
40. C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, § 5, at 14. Although Wright offers this view as
a reason for Congress' reluctance to create specialized courts, it is reasonable
to believe that this view also explains the court's reluctance to allow broad ju-
risdiction of specialized courts. The experiences of the Commerce Court cer-
tainly support this view. Created in 1910, the Commerce Court was quickly
abolished because of allegations that it was dominated by the railroad industry.
Haworth & Meador, A Proposed New Federal Intermediate Appellate Court, 12
U. MICH. J.. REF. 201, 227-28 (1978). This experience created a fear that special-
ized courts would produce "tunnel visioned judges." Id. Accord, COMMISSION
ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTER-
NAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 67 F.R.D. 195, 234-35 (1975).
Other fears were that vested interests might capture a specialized court, id. at
235, that exclusive jurisdiction would "reduce the incentive ... to produce a
thorough and persuasive opinion in articulation and support of a decision," id.,
and that the quality of appointments would suffer. Id.
41. C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, § 5.
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vision" that other full-time specialized judges have developed
and that Congress has feared.4 2 Although TECA judges are
likely to develop special expertise on ESA and EPAA matters,
that expertise is merely a by-product of the TECA system.
Congress sought to achieve consistency of ESA and EPAA de-
cision making by centralizing appeals arising from those acts in
one tribunal, not by creating a panel of narrowly specialized
judges.4 3 Because the TECA was not designed to reach consis-
tency solely through specialized expertise and because there is
no danger of overspecialization among TECA judges, the gen-
eral rule requiring strict construction of jurisdictional grants to
specialized courts should not apply to the TECA.
Nonetheless, even nonspecialized courts tend to narrowly
construe statutory grants of jurisdiction.44 Out of deference to
the constitutionally mandated separation of powers between
the different branches of the government, courts are careful not
to usurp Congress' power to define the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts.4 5 Thus, even if the principle of strict construc-
tion of jurisdictional grants to specialized courts does not apply
to the TECA, the broader principle of strict construction argua-
bly does apply to the TECA. But this principle is merely a ca-
non of construction;4 6 courts should not adhere to this principle
if it frustrates the statutory scheme that provides for jurisdic-
42. See note 40 supra.
43. See notes 51-53 infra and accompanying text. See also P. CARRINGTON,
D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 36, at 170 ("specialized courts with
generalized judges could assure in some cases a competently expert court,
without the hazards associated with long-term entrenchment in specialties or
the even graver hazards associated with the selection of specialist judges for
duties close to the vital interests of well-organized political groups").
44. "Statutes which deprive a court of jurisdiction are strictly construed,
and when jurisdiction is once granted it will not be deemed taken away by a
[grant of similar jurisdiction to another court]." 3 C. SANDs, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTON § 67.03, at 224 (4th ed. 1974) (footnotes omitted). See
Rosecrans v. United States, 165 U.S. 257, 260-63 (1897); United States v. Ameri-
can Bell Tel. Co., 159 U.S. 548, 549-50 (1895).
45. Felix Frankfurter acknowledged that-
[t]he central problem of statutory construction is to ascertain meaning.
But the meaning is to be found by one authority of another's composi-
tion. The divorce of the functions of authorship and interpretation be-
comes of profound importance when such divorce is one of the great
safeguards of a free society. This may sound like a highfalutin way of
referring to the separation of powers. Highfalutin or not, consciously
kept in mind or not, this is the source of the judiciary's problems in
construing legislation.
Frankfurter, A Symposium on Statutory Construction-Foreward, 3 VAD. L.
REV. 365, 366 (1950). See also Horack, Cooperative Action for Improved Statu-
tory Construction, 3 VAND. L. REv. 382, 388-89 (1950).
46. See United States v. California, 504 F.2d 750, 754 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975).
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tion.47 Strict adherence to this principle has partially frus-
trated the statutory scheme of the TECA by creating a system
of bifurcated appeals that causes hardship to parties, forced de-
cision making, and inefficient judicial administration.48
In cases in which the district court has certified substantive
constitutional questions to the TECA, the TECA has not ap-
plied the principle of strict construction. Although section
211(c) of the ESA grants the TECA discretion to decide either
the entire case in which the constitutional question arises or
merely the constitutional issues involved,49 the TECA has inva-
riably taken jurisdiction of the entire case.50 These decisions
47. Another policy militates against adherence to this principle when bi-
furcated appeals would result-
The principle which pervades the modern systems of pleading, espe-
cially the federal system, as exemplified by the free permissive joinder
of claims, liberal amendment provisions, and compulsory counter-
claims, is that the whole controversy between the parties may and
often must be brought before the same court in the same action.
Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464, 470 (3d Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951). Although Williamson involved the application of
res judicata, the opinion evinces the desire that courts and lawmakers have for
convenient, efficient judicial procedure.
This desire is also evident from the increasing willingness of federal courts
to exercise pendent jurisdiction. Although this trend is partially attributable to
the recent creation of federal rights that are coextensive with state rights, it
also derives from the "complexity and expense of modern litigation" which en-
courages the settlement of disputes between parties in a single suit. Note,
UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HAnv. L. REv. 657, 657 (1968). In
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 545-46 (1974), the Supreme Court stated: "[I]t is
evident from Gibbs that pendent state claims are not always, or even almost
always, to be dismissed [by the federal courts]. On the contrary, given advan-
tages of economy and convenience, and no unfairness to litigants, Gibbs con-
templates adjudication of these claims."
48. See notes 29-36 supra and accompanying text.
49. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210,
§ 211(c), 85 Stat. 749 (expired 1974), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, at 586
(1976).
50. See, e.g., Griffin v. United States, 537 F.2d 1130, 1137 (Temp Emer. Ct.
App. 1976) ("We do not deal with mere abstractions in responding to certified
constitutional issues.., and we need not close our eyes to pendent considera-
tions or consequences."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976); United States v. Pro
Football, Inc., 514 F.2d 1396, 1397 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975) ("[The TECA]
granted the government's motion to have the entire case, both constitutional
and non-constitutional issues, presented to [it] for final disposition."); DeRieux
v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321, 1323 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.) ("[The TECA]
granted the joint motion ... to have the entire cases.. . presented to [it] for
consideration."), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974); Schertzinger v. Dunlop, 489
F.2d 1307, 1309 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973) (The TECA exercised discretion
under section 211(c) of the ESA to hear the entire case.); United States v. Ohio,
487 F.2d 936, 938 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973) (The TECA heard the entire case
from which constitutional issues were certified, but only because the facts were
undisputed and no extensive evidentiary hearing was required.), arfd sub nom.
Fry v. U.S., 421 U.S. 542 (1975); National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. Dunlop,
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are inconsistent with the TECA's usual refusal to hear non-
ESA or non-EPAA issues. The TECA's willingness to decide
entire cases in the context of constitutional questions suggests
that an alternative to the issue approach may be feasible in
other cases.
IV. A SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR DEF[NING THE
TECA'S APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The proper scope of the TECA's appellate jurisdiction can
best be analyzed by considering, first, what role Congress in-
tended for the TECA, in light of the legislative history and lan-
guage of the TECA's jurisdictional grant, and second, what
jurisdictional approach would best enable the TECA to fulfill
that role. The TECA's legislative history indicates that Con-
gress created this emergency court of appeals 51 in response to
the contentions of the TECA's proponents that the entire stabi-
lization program and system of national economic controls
would be jeopardized without special review provisions.5 2
486 F.2d 1388 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973) (The TECA remanded to the district
court the entire case from which constitutional issues had been improperly cer-
tified.). In addition, the TECA has indicated its willingness to hear cases in
which issues of mootness, ripeness, or venue are raised on appeal. See Quincy
Oil, Inc. v. FEA, No. 1-5, (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 1980) (mootness); Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. DOE, 596 F.2d 1029 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978) (ripeness);
Mosely v. Nationwide Purchasing, Inc., 485 F.2d 418 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1973) (venue). The TECA has gone so far as to assume jurisdiction of a case in
which an estoppel defense was the only issue raised on appeal. United States
v. Wickland, No. 9-45 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1980) (claim in district
court based on EPAA). The TECA has thus broadened its "issue" approach.
51. The TECA is the second emergency court that Congress has created.
The first court of appeals was created in 1942, but has since been abolished. C.
WRIGHT, supra note 21, § 5, at 14.
52. Two members of the Nixon Administration, John Connally and Charles
E. Walker, made the following arguments in support of the TECA
Cases will be tried at the district court level ....
We propose that the appellate level for all cases under this act con-
sist of one court-the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals ....
The purpose of this court is to provide one focal point for court deci-
sions made under this program. This will avoid inconsistent decisions
and will insure speed of decision by bypassing the crowded dockets of
the circuit courts of appeals. Such a court was used with great success
in earlier price controls efforts.
We believe that these judicial review provisions will make an es-
sential contribution to the fair administration of the program and that
they properly balance the requirements for individual fairness and
prompt determinations with the need for smoothly functioning admin-
istrative action.
Hearings on H.R 11309 to Extend and Amend the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970, Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
'314 (1971) (statement of John Connally, Secretary of the Treasury) [hereinafter
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These review provisions were thought necessary to ensure con-
sistent implementation of the ESA and EPAA, to minimize de-
lay in administering the ESA and EPAA programs, and to
provide relief for persons aggrieved by the operation of those
programs. 53
The plain language of TECA's jurisdictional grant can be
interpreted in two ways. In that grant Congress used the
phrase "cases and controversies arising under" the ESA or the
EPAA.54 If Congress used the phrase as a term of art, it man-
dates traditional arising under jurisdiction for the TECA and
therefore only issues raised in the complaint may be consid-
cited as House Hearings]; Economic Stabilization Legislation: Hearings on
S.2712 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1971) (statement of Charles E. Walker, Under Secretary,
Department of the Treasury) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
David Ginsburg, former General Counsel of the Office of Price Administra-
tion, stated: 'The objective is certainly to have a single court of appeals to re-
view cases wherever they arise throughout the country. This enables a single
policy to be established, a single price policy or wage policy, for the entire
country." Senate Hearings, supra, at 127 (statement of David Ginsburg, Attor-
ney at Law, Washington, D.C.).
One apparent exception to this objective appears in the final version of the
bill. As originally introduced in the House and Senate, the bill creating the
TECA provided that ESA actions could originate only in the federal district
courts. S. 2712, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 208 (1971); H.R. 11309, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 208 (1971). Later, a provision was incorporated in the bill providing that
courts of competent jurisdiction-including state courts-could hear cases in
which ESA issues are raised as a defense. This provision was included in the
final version of the bill passed by both Houses. Economic Stabilization Act
Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 211(a), 85 Stat. 748 (expired 1974), re-
printed in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, at 586 (1976). The Joint Conference Commit-
tee, when adopting the provision, stated that the "Conferees felt that the...
provisions would facilitate efficient and equitable administration of the Act."
HR. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 15th Sess. 20-21, reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2310 (Conference Report- Joint Explanatory Statement of
the Comm. of Conference). Questioning before. the Senate committee estab-
lished that the senators were concerned about the inconvenience that would be
caused to their constituents by requiring that even the most insignificant ESA
issues be heard in federal district court. Senate Hearings, supra, at 33-34
(statement of John Connally, Secretary of the Treasury [dialogue between
Senator Thomas McIntyre and L Patrick Gray III, Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Division, Department of Justice]); Senate Hearings, supra, at 56-57 (state-
ment of Alan Cranston, U.S. Senator from California [dialogue between Sena-
tor John Sparkman, Chairman of Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, and Charles E. Walker, Under Secretary, Department of the
Treasury]). The senators were also concerned about the work load that would
be placed on the district court without that provision. Senate Hearings, supra,
at 50-51 (statement of Charles E. Walker, Under Secretary, Department of the
Treasury [dialogue between Senator Robert Taft and L. Patrick Gray II, Assis-
tant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice]).
53. See note 52 supra; S. REP. No. 507, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in
[1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2283, 2292.
54. See note 7 supra.
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ered.5 5 If, however, Congress intended that the phrase retain
its ordinary meaning, it mandates jurisdiction for the TECA in
any case containing an ESA or EPAA issue.56 As the Coastal
States court indicates, limiting the TECA to traditional arising
under jurisdiction contravenes the reason for creating the
TECA.57 If the TECA may consider only the issues raised in
the complaint, ESA or EPAA issues raised in a counterclaim or
defense would be considered by the circuit court. Such a sys-
tem would undermine the goals of consistent decision making
for ESA and EPAA matters. The remaining approach, case ju-
risdiction, is most likely to achieve the goal of consistent deci-
sion making.5 8 Under a case approach, the TECA would take
jurisdiction over any case involving an ESA or EPAA issue,
whether raised by complaint, answer, counterclaim, or other-
wise.5 9 But as the Coastal States court correctly noted, unlim-
ited case jurisdiction would be overly inclusive. 60 ESA or
EPAA issues raised in the district court may be frivolous or un-
related to the central issues on appeal and may have no effect
on the court's decision. Giving the TECA jurisdiction over such
issues would serve the purpose of consistency, but would bur-
den the TECA with many cases in which the major issues are
unrelated to the ESA or the EPAA,61 and would frustrate the
goal of efficiency.
A grant of limited case jurisdiction, however, would be con-
sistent with both the plain language of the TECA's jurisdic-
tional grant and the goals of consistent, efficient decision
making. Limited case jurisdiction would require the TECA to
decide the entire case on appeal, including issues not arising
under the ESA or the EPAA, but only if an ESA or EPAA issue
had been adjudicated by the district court. Adoption of this ap-
55. See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
56. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
57. 604 F.2d at 183-87. One court has adopted this approach. See St. Mary's
Hosp. v. Ogilvie, 496 F.2d 1324, 1326 (7th Cir. 1974). The special court created by
section 209 of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 45 U.S.C. § 719 (1976), has
also rejected the "well pleaded complaint rule." See Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Illinois, 423 F. Supp. 941, 947 (Spec. Ct. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1095 (1977).
58. The Coastal States Court indirectly admitted that only the case juris-
diction approach could further the goals of speed and consistency. See 604 F.2d
at 183, 184. Although the Coastal States opinion does not adequately discuss
the case jurisdiction approach, it does fully discuss the issue jurisdiction ap-
proach.
59. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
60. 604 F.2d at 183, 187.
61. The unlimited case approach "withdraws from the courts of appeals
many non-ESA issues, which may really be the dominant issues in the case."
Id. at 183. See also id. at 187.
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proach would avoid the problems of unlimited case jurisdiction
by eliminating cases that contain unimportant ESA or EPAA
issues, while ensuring the necessary consistency that is sacri-
ficed under the "arising under" approach.
The limited case approach would also avoid many of the
problems associated with bifurcated appeals,62 and thus help
achieve the congressional goals of consistency, minimal delay,
and relief for aggrieved persons. The limited case approach
would end the confusion that is caused by the issue approach,
since there is no need to separate issues and decide the proper
forum for each issue. Under the limited case approach, liti-
gants would merely need to determine whether the district
court has adjudicated an ESA or EPAA issue. If such an issue
has been adjudicated, the litigants could be confident that the
TECA would have jurisdiction over the entire appeal. More-
over, because the TECA would review the entire case, litigants
would not have to argue the same case before two different
courts. The limited case approach would also eliminate the
forced decision making that is inevitable under a system of bi-
furcated appeals whenever the TECA and a circuit court must
decide nearly identical but severed issues.63 Under a limited
case system, the TECA would decide both issues. Because ju-
risdiction of the cases involving adjudicated ESA or EPAA is-
sues would be entirely in the TECA, the delay, resulting when
proceedings in either the TECA or a circuit court must be
stayed pending the decision of related issues in the other
court 64 as well as when different courts must decide where ju-
risdiction exists,65 will be eliminated.
The application of limited case jurisdiction would be rela-
tively simple and would resemble jurisdictional allocations
often made by courts in other contexts. To determine whether
limited case jurisdiction is appropriate, the court must employ
a two-part inquiry. First, it must inquire whether the issue ac-
tually arises under the ESA or the EPAA, and second, whether
the district court actually adjudicated the issue. The first in-
quiry is necessary whenever courts are specialized in subject
62. See notes 29-36 supra and accompanying text.
63. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
64. See note 35 supra.
65. For example, the problems in Gordon v. Laborers' Int'l, 490 F.2d 133, 139
(10th Cir. 1973), ce t denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974), see text accompanying note 34
supra, would be solved under a limited case approach. In Gordon, the TECA
would have heard all appealed issues joined with an appealed, adjudicated
ESA or EPAA issue.
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matter, regardless of the jurisdictional approach taken.66 The
Supreme Court's reasoning in Bray v. United States67 illus-
trates how courts would approach this inquiry. In Bray, the
Court held that because the defendant's conviction for criminal
contempt did not depend on the "existence of [ESA] violations
or even the continuation of the investigation" into such viola-
tions, the contempt conviction was a separate proceeding.68
Thus, because the contempt issues did not arise under the
ESA, TECA review was not warranted. Similarly, the only is-
sues adjudicated by the district court and appealed to the
TECA in Clark Oil & Refining Company v. Department of En-
ergy69 arose under statutes other than the ESA or the EPAA.
Under a limited case approach, the TECA therefore wquld not
have jurisdiction over the appeal.
The inquiry into whether the district court adjudicated a
TECA issue is best exemplified by the Second Circuit's deci-
sion in Coastal States. This case held that the TECA was the
appropriate forum for appealed issues when a district court
judge decided an ESA issue while ruling on a motion to vacate
the district court judgment.7 0 Under the Coastal States ration-
ale, an ESA or EPAA issue should be viewed as "adjudicated"
when the district court rules on an ESA or EPAA issue that
materially affects the outcome of the case. Courts are accus-
tomed to making such decisions, so this requirement should
create no new problems.7 1
The limited case approach is not without difficulties. These
problems, however, seem insignificant when compared to the
problems that the limited case approach avoids. First, the wor-
kload of the TECA could increase because, in addition to the
ESA or EPAA issues currently heard by the TECA, the TECA
would also hear issues that are now reviewed by the circuit
courts. It is possible that as the TECA's work load increases,
66. See generally cases cited in note 31 supra.
67. 423 U.S. 73 (1975) (per curiam).
68. Id. at 76.
69. No. DC-53 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1979), discussed in note 15
supra and accompanying text.
70. Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp., 604
F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1979).
71. The circuit courts can only hear appeals from final decisions of the dis-
trict courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). Such a requirement is very similar to the
adjudication requirement of the limited case approach. Though defining final-
ity is sometimes difficult, the "saving grace of the imprecise rule of finality is
that in almost all situations it is entirely clear, either from the nature of the or-
der or from a crystallized body of decisions, that a particular order is or is not
finaL" C. WRiGHT, supra note 21, § 101, at 505 (footnote omitted).
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TECA decisions would be delayed, thwarting the goal of timely
decision making. The limited case approach would, however,
increase the number of issues that the TECA must decide only
in cases in which appeals are now bifurcated. Given the rela-
tively small number of bifurcated appeals each year, the real
increase in the number of issues for the TECA's consideration
would not be great.72 Moreover, because the TECA's docket is
not nearly as crowded as a circuit court docket, even with some
increase in the TECA's work load the TECA would still be able
to process cases much faster than the circuit courts.7 3 If the
TECA is allowed to decide all issues in a case, it is likely that
parties aggrieved by the operation of the ESA or the EPAA will
receive quicker review of all issues appealed than they now re-
ceive, thus furthering the congressional policy of "individual
72. Since the TECA's inception in 1971, it has decided 284 cases. Director,
Administrative Office, United States Courts, Annual Report, 207, 208 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Annual Report]. Of these, only a handful resulted in bi-
furcated appeals. See cases cited in note 11 supra.
73. Fifty-one TECA cases were docketed in 1979 as compared with 35 cases
docketed in 1978. In 1978, TECA disposed of 17 cases. In 1979, TECA disposed
of 34 cases. As of Sept. 30, 1979, 33 cases were pending before the TECA. Chief
Judge Tamm reports that 35 to 50 cases are appealed to TECA yearly and that
the case flow is steady. There are usually two cases awaiting opinions and
seven cases scheduled for hearings at all times. Hearings for all TECA cases
occur within two months of the date on which cases were filed with the TECA.
This swift disposition of cases is partly because the time allowed for filing
briefs and answers for TECA appeals is one-half the time allowed for filing
briefs and answers in circuit courts. Letter from TECA Chief Judge Tamm to
Director, Administrative Office, United States Courts, reprinted in Annual Re-
port, supra note 72.
In the more than seven years of the TECA's existence, TECA opinions
were not rendered within three months of TECA hearings in only four cases,
one of which involved sums of $1.3 billion. Given these figures and the rela-
tively small number of cases involving non-ESA/EPAA issues that would be
heard by the TECA if the TECA were to adopt a limited case approach, it is
difficult to imagine that using a limited case approach would significantly affect
the TECA's admirable case disposition record.
Circuit court dockets are much more crowded. From August 1978 to Sep-
tember 1979, 21,127 appeals were filed in the circuit courts. Administrative Of-
fice of the United States Courts, Statistical Analysis and Reports Division,
Federal Judicial Workload Statistics 1 (1979) (for the twelve-month period
ending September 30, 1979). As of September 30, 1979, 18,695 cases were termi-
nated and 19,615 were left pending. Id. As of September 30, 1979, 525 cases
were held under submission (after hearings but awaiting opinions) in the
courts of appeals and the court of claims for more than three months; 288 such
cases had been submitted for more than three but less than six months
(54.9%); 154 such cases had been submitted for more than six but less than
nine months (29.3%); 45 such cases had been submitted for more than nine
months but less than a year (8.6%); 38 such cases had been submitted for more
than one full year (7.2%). The District of Columbia, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
led the other circuits with 65, 158, and 75 cases held under submission, respec-
tively. Id. at 15.
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fairness and prompt determination." 74
Second, increasing the TECA's work load would probably
require TECA judges to spend more time deciding TECA cases
than they now spend. This problem, however, would probably
not be severe since the real increase in the TECA's work load
would be minimal. Moreover, if the time commitments became
too burdensome, the Chief Justice could exercise the power
given him by Congress to appoint new members to the court.7
It might appear that the extra time that judges would spend on
TECA matters could force the judges to be more narrowly spe-
cialized.76 Such narrow specialization is, however, unlikely be-
cause any additional issues the TECA would decide under the
limited case approach would be general issues that the circuit
courts now decide.77
Third, use of a limited case approach could also cause juris-
dictional problems when cases on appeal involve issues arising
under two regulatory statutes, which both contain specific judi-
cial review provisions.78 For example, in Municipal Electric
Utilities Association v. Federal Power Commission,79 the court
was faced with issues arising under both the Federal Power Act
(FPA) and the EPAA. The FPA provides for appellate review
of Federal Power Commission orders in the courts of appeals
74. See note 52 supra; text accompanying note 53 supra.
75. Economic Stabilization Act of 1971, Pub. Law No. 92-210, § 211(b)(1), 85
Stat. 749 (expired 1974), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, at 586 (1976) (incor-
porated in EPAA, 15 U.S.C. 754(a) (1) (Supp. 1979)).
76. For a description of the problems involved in judicial overspecializa-
tion, see note 40 supra.
77. A further problem could occur under a limited case approach if the dis-
trict court ignores key ESA or EPAA issues. Because this approach allows the
TECA to hear only cases in which ESA or EPAA issues have been adjudicated,
the TECA's primary function of settling ESA and EPAA issues would be frus-
trated if such issues were ignored. This problem is not, however, unique to a
limited case approach; under the TECA's current issue approach, the TECA
must also determine whether the district court has adjudicated an ESA or
EPAA issue. See Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. New England Petroleum
Corp., 604 F.2d 179, 187 (2d Cir. 1979). If the Problem arises, the TECA could
apply the approach circuit courts employ when mitigating the analogous prob-
lem of district courts ignoring important issues. See C. WRIGHrT, supra note 21,
§ 104, at 523 ("[a]n appellee in a circuit court may defend a judgment on any
ground consistent with the record, even if rejected by the lower court") (foot-
note omitted). See also Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ludwig, 426 U.S. 479
(1976).
78. See, e.g., Newell v. FEA, 591 F.2d 704 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979); Con-
necticut Mun. Group v. Federal Power Comm'n, 498 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Groton v. Federal Power Comm'n, 487 F.2d 927 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973);
Municipal Elec. Util. Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 485 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
79. 485 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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for the circuit where a party is located or in the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals.80 Using the issue approach, the Cir-
cuit Court stated that an "entirely harmonious accommodation
of the two pertinent Congressional enactments can be achieved
by dual review of [the FPC] order... ,each tribunal acting
within the sphere of its statutorily defined exclusive jurisdic-
tion."8 m But using a limited case approach, the TECA would
have heard the entire case. This would arguably be an unwar-
ranted assumption of the circuit courts' jurisdiction over FPA
issues. There is, however, evidence that the TECA could prop-
erly assume jurisdiction of Federal Power Act issues. The cir-
cuit courts hear such issues only when such an assumption of
jurisdiction would not "constitute an embarassment to the sep-
arate jurisdiction of the District Court [and the TECA]" under
the ESA.82 Moreover, circuit courts already defer to the TECA
when FPA issues are inextricably intertwined with ESA or
EPAA issues, holding their review in abeyance until TECA re-
view of the case is finished.83 By allowing the TECA to initially
decide which issues it will hear and by recognizing the primary
importance of determining ESA or EPAA issues quickly,84 the
circuit courts appear willing to allow the TECA to assume lim-
ited case jurisdiction. In the context of the Natural Gas Act,
the District of Columbia Circuit has resolved a similar conflict
in appellate review provisions in favor of the TECA, reasoning
inter alia that because the ESA deals with the matter of ap-
peals in "specific" terms, it must override a general statutory
jurisdictional grant of review to the circuit court.8 5 From a
practical standpoint, the problems associated with bifurcated
80. 16 U.S.C. § 825(1), (p) (1976).
81. 485 F.2d at 971.
82. Id.
83. Connecticut Mun. Group v. Federal Power Comm'n, 498 F.2d 993, 998
(D.C. Cir. 1974). By allowing the TECA to decide such appeals, the circuit
courts disregard the judicial review provisions of the Federal Power Act.
84. In Connecticut Municipal Group, the District of Columbia Circuit ap-
parently originally refused to hear any of the appeal because the Federal
Power Act question "appeared so integrated into an analysis of the purpose
and legislative intent of the [ESA] that its extraction and separate review
would have frustrated the goals... contemplated by the ESA." Id. at 997. See
also Municipal Intervenors Group v. Federal Power Comm'n, 473 F.2d 84, 89-90
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
85. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, No. 77-1511, slip op. at 4 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 1980). One
commentator has stated that "[i]t is not so clear that TECA's exercise of pen-
dent jurisdiction over Natural Gas claims would have done violence to the will
of Congress." Theis, Pendent Jurisdiction Over Claims Arising Under Federal
Law (publication forthcoming in Hastings L.J. (manuscript, 44)).
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appeals,8 6 which may frustrate the dual congressional purposes
of prompt, consistent resolution of ESA or EPAA issues and of
relief for persons aggrieved by the operation of either act, also
justify TECA limited case jurisdiction even when other regula-
tory statutes are involved.
V. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TECA'S
JURISDICTIONAL APPROACH
The issue approach that has been chosen to resolve the
TECA's jurisdictional problems has other important implica-
tions beyond those it creates for the TECA. Pending legislation
evinces a trend toward establishing more specialized subject
matter courts to deal with complex, technical areas of the law.87
The pending legislation would create two specialized tribunals:
one would review patent appeals and appeals involving claims
against the federal government, 88 and the other would review
tax appeals.8 9 As with the TECA, the problem of defining the
jurisdiction of these courts will inevitably arise.
The proposal dealing with patent appeals would create a
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with ex-
clusive jurisdiction of all civil patent cases now appealable both
to the circuit courts from the federal district courts, and to the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals from the Patent and
Trademark Office administrative board. The Federal Circuit
Court would also hear appeals of nearly all claims currently
within the existing Court of Claims appellate jurisdiction.90
86. See notes 29-36 supra and accompanying text.
87. The legislation originated in the Senate as S. 677 and S. 678, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979). The current version of the bills is S. 1477, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979); S. 1477 is explained and summarized in S. REP. No. 304, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979). The sponsors of the Senate bills were Senators Kennedy and
DeConcini. S. 1477 passed in the Senate on October 30, 1979, and was referred
to the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Courts. No formal House
action has yet been taken on S. 1477. The legislation is patterned after a propo-
sal by Charles R. Haworth and Daniel J. Meador, although it differs from that
proposal in certain important respects. See Haworth & Meador, supra note 40,
at 201. The most important difference is that the Meador proposal would give
jurisdiction of tax cases, environmental cases, claims against the government,
and patent cases to one court. Id. at 225.
88. Sections 301 through 354 of S. 1477 deal with patent appeals and the ab-
olition of the Court of Claims.
89. Sections 401 through 407 of S. 1477 deal with tax appeals. Sections 501
through 509 deal with technical and conforming amendments relating to the
proposed courts. Sections 601 and 602 set the effective date of the bill and the
orderly transition to the new patent and tax case appellate system.
90. The jurisdiction of the new Federal Circuit Court is described at S.
REP. No. 304, supra note 87, at 35-37. The Senate report also states:
The bill creates an article MI court that is similar in structure to the
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The proposal dealing with tax appeals would create a United
States Court of Tax Appeals with exclusive jurisdiction of civil
tax cases now appealable both to the federal circuit courts of
appeals and to the Tax Court. Current Court of Claims juris-
diction over tax cases would be eliminated under the propo-
sal.91 The administration of patent and tax law would be
improved by providing for centralized, uniform patent and tax
appeals decisions.92
Inconsistent interpretations of these legislative proposals
indicate that confusion about the proper jurisdictional bounda-
ries for these proposed courts already exists.93 Because the
courts which would be created by the pending legislation would
eleven other courts of appeals. It is composed of the twelve judgeships
of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
which become United States circuit judgeships; those courts are abol-
ished by the merger. The new court is on line with other Federal
courts of appeals; that is, it is not a new tier in the judicial structure.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit differs from other
Federal courts of appeals, however, in that its jurisdiction is defined in
terms of subject matter rather than geography.
Id. at 8-9.
For a detailed discussion of current appellate procedure in patent cases
and the current jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, see Haworth & Meador,
supra note 40, at 201, 215-17, 220-24 (1978).
91. The jurisdiction of the new Court of Tax Appeals is described in S.
REP. No. 304, supra note 87, at 39-41. The jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Ap-
peals was summarized as follows:
To solve the problems surrounding the resolution of civil tax is-
sues, S. 1477 proposes two major changes in present law.
1. The creation of a United States Court of Tax Appeals with
exclusive jurisdiction over civil tax appeals from the district
court and the Tax Court; and
2. The elimination of Court of Claims jurisdiction over tax
cases.
By virtue of these changes, all civil tax cases would be initiated in ei-
ther the United States Tax Court or district courts and all civil tax ap-
peals would be heard by the newly created Court of Tax Appeals.
Although the decisions of the new court would be subject to review by
the Supreme Court on certiorari, it is anticipated that such review
would be a rare occurrence. For all practical purposes, the new Court
of Tax Appeals would become the final authority in the judicial inter-
pretation of the Federal internal revenue laws.
Id. at 16 (footnote omitted).
92. See id. at 8, 16-17.
93. Although the Senate Report seems to require the Federal Circuit Court
to hear entire cases, id. at 13, an indication that the Federal Circuit Court
would have case jurisdiction is made in the context of reassuring skeptics that
Federal Circuit Court judges would not be unduly specialized. The jurisdiction
of the Court of Tax Appeals is even more ambiguous because the judges would
sit part-time on that court (as do TECA judges), id. at 19, and would have to
constantly "consider questions of property, contracts, agency, partnerships, cor-
porations, equity, trusts, [and] procedure ... if they [were] ever to deal effec-
tively with the many problems that make up modern tax law." Haworth &
Meador, supra note 40, at 228-29 n.169. Since tax cases contain a variety of is-
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closely resemble the TECA,94 it is likely that these new courts
might follow the TECA's example and assume an issue ap-
proach to jurisdiction. To avoid this possibility, Congress
should carefully draft the jurisdictional provisions so that these
new courts will not create additional bifurcated appellate sys-
tems by narrowly interpreting statutory grants of jurisdiction.
Although a trend toward the establishment of specialized
courts may be inevitable because of the increasingly technical
and complicated nature of the law, an associated trend toward
the establishment of bifurcated appellate systems can and
should be avoided.
VI. CONCLUSION
In cases involving issues that do not arise under the ESA
or the EPAA, the TECA's statutory grant of appellate jurisdic-
tion is unclear. Courts have decided that in such cases the
TECA's jurisdiction should be confined to the issues that arise
under the ESA or the EPAA, thus necessitating the bifurcation
of cases on appeal. This system of bifurcated appeals has re-
sulted in confusion, hardship for litigants, forced decision mak-
ing, and delay.
sues, the proposed Court of Tax Appeals would certainly be compelled to
choose between "issue" and "case" jurisdiction, just as the TECA has done.
Haworth and Meador have indicated that their proposed court, would have
jurisdiction of all ancillary or pendent matters making up the patent, environ-
mental, tax or government claims cases before the new court. Haworth & Mea-
dor, supra note 40, at 225, 228 & n.169; Meador, A Proposal For a New Federal
Intermediate Appellate Court, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 665, 673 (1978). Other com-
mentators, however, have paraphrased Meador as suggesting that "cases, such
as antitrust defenses to the main patent action, would not go to the new Court."
Miller, Future of the CCPA, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 676, 678 (1978).
94. The TECA resembles both the Haworth-Meador and the Kennedy-
DeConcini proposals. Because TECA judges assume only part-time TECA
duty, they are generalists. Such a characteristic was important in both propos-
als. All three jurisdictional schemes also provide courts with subject matter ju-
risdiction over certain kinds of cases, and thus each court must determine how
much of an appeal Congress intended it to hear.
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals may need to apply limited case juris-
diction even more than the TECA or the Haworth-Meador proposed court. Al-
though bifurcated appeals should be avoided in any event, the judges in
Kennedy's proposed Circuit Court would hear only two kinds of claims-patent
and government claims cases. Although the variety and general nature of gov-
ernment claims cases guarantees that Kennedy's Federal Circuit Court judges
would be generalists to some degree, the patent cases may demand a much
higher percentage of the judges' time. If the issue jurisdiction of patent cases
is given to this court, these judges would become even more specialized than
they already are. Since they are capable of handling nonpatent claims, as
demonstrated by the jurisdictional grant of governmental claims appeals, they
should do so to help perserve their generalist standing and judicial integrity.
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The analysis that courts have used to support the current
definition of the TECA's jurisdiction is flawed by a failure to
consider the approaches to the TECA's jurisdiction that would
better serve the TECA's objectives and by an inappropriate ad-
herence to the doctrine of strict construction of jurisdictional
grants to specialized courts. Consideration of the TECA's ob-
jective to provide a remedy for parties aggrieved by operation
of the ESA or the EPAA in a prompt and consistent manner
supports the conclusion that a limited case approach most ap-
propriately defines the TECA's appellate jurisdiction. Under
this approach, the TECA would take jurisdiction of all issues in
a case if the district court had adjudicated any ESA or EPAA
issue. Such an approach would eliminate the problems caused
by bifurcated appeals and could be easily administered by the
courts. Although the limited case approach may cause certain
problems, including an increase in the TECA's work load and
an assumption of jurisdiction over issues arising under other
regulatory acts, these problems are minimal compared to the
problems caused by other approaches. In view of pending leg-
islation that would create specialized courts closely resembling
the TECA, it is important that the problems surrounding the
TECA's jurisdiction be remedied to provide an effective model
for the proposed courts.
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